

# Digital path of clean governance in the new era based on Marxist theory of state governance

*Xinyi Lei*

Department of Party-mass Work, Offshore (Zhuhai) Heavy Industry Co., Ltd., Zhuhai, China

15803511900@163.com

---

**Abstract.** As digital technology becomes deeply embedded in the national governance system, clean governance faces real challenges such as data silos, lagging oversight, and insufficient transparency in the exercise of power. This paper uses Marxist theory of national governance as its analytical framework, employing a combination of literature review and case analysis. First, it reviews the core Marxist discourses on power supervision and the subjectivity of the people, constructing a three-dimensional analytical model of "institution-technology-subjectivity". Second, it selects 31 provincial-level digital platforms for clean governance nationwide as samples, using fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) to identify the configuration paths of digital clean governance. Finally, it explains the path mechanisms through in-depth interviews. The study found that the synergistic improvement of data sharing and algorithmic supervision coverage is the core driving condition. High-efficiency configurations covered 78.6% of high-integrity-index cases, with a consistency rate of 0.92. Platforms embedding blockchain evidence storage mechanisms improved the efficiency of handling complaints and reports by approximately 37%, and achieved a 96.7% completeness rate of power operation record keeping. This paper provides theoretical basis and practical reference for digital empowerment of integrity governance.

**Keywords:** Marxist theory of state governance, clean governance, digitalization approach, fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis, power supervision

---

## 1. Introduction

The penetration of digital technology into the national governance system has evolved from an auxiliary tool to an underlying architecture, and the field of anti-corruption governance is also undergoing profound technological reshaping. The obstacles to the effective functioning of the provincial-level anti-corruption digital platforms, however, are much greater than what technological optimists had envisioned: At some points the power operations are recorded manually and not captured automatically by the system; There is no mechanism to verify and make transparent the chain of operations from public complaints to their feedback; Data barriers between departments hinder the flow of information needed for supervision; The acceptance to feedback process of public complaints is long and the mechanism is not verifiable and transparent. These unfortunate situations are not just technology glitches, but a compressed form of a failure in the way institutions are designed, the embedding of technology, and the supervision of it. Theoretically, there is an

unanswered question up for discussion that has been driving the effectiveness of power supervision under digital conditions: What conditions and what combination of conditions will drive the effectiveness of power supervision under digital conditions?

Marxist national governance theory regards power supervision as an institutional guarantee for safeguarding the people's dominant position. This analytical perspective provides theoretical depth for the study of clean governance that goes beyond pure technical theory. This paper builds a three-dimensional "system-technology-subject" analysis model under this framework, selects 31 provincial-level anti-corruption digital platforms across the country as research samples, and uses fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis to identify configuration paths for high governance effectiveness. The introduction of the fsQCA method breaks the assumption of independent net effects of variables in traditional regression analysis, and instead focuses on the concurrent combination and equivalent substitution relationship of multiple conditions. This methodological choice is consistent with the intrinsic attribute of clean governance itself as a complex system engineering—the marginal contribution of a single variable is far less explanatory than the linkage configuration between conditions. The addition of in-depth interviews makes up for the limitations of the set theory method in explaining the causal mechanism, allowing the institutional logic and actor strategies behind the path to emerge.

This paper theoretically connects Marxist ideas on power supervision with the technological characteristics of digital governance, revealing the forms of people's subjectivity in the context of algorithmic supervision and data sharing, and avoiding the simplistic reduction of digital integrity governance to a matter of technical efficiency. In practice, it opens the door to multiple equivalent routes to high efficiency and offers differentiated—not one size fits all—reference solutions for regions of varying resource endowments, as opposed to the linear model that emphasizes the variable. Practically, it independently examines the role of blockchain evidence storage mechanisms in whistleblowing and power traceability, providing empirical evidence for prioritizing technical modules in platform construction, rather than remaining at the level of general "digital empowerment" advocacy.

## 2. Related work

The intersection of governance theory and digital technology has accumulated multiple research threads, involving both the institutional foundation of traditional power supervision and extending to the governance framework design of emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence and blockchain. The relevant literature can be sorted out from the following dimensions. Perlman et al. [1] explored two ethical management methods found in the literature: compliance-based and integrity-based, often referred to as low-way and high-way. Al-Faryan [2] aimed to re-examine the concept of separation of ownership and control by reviewing research on agency theory, governance and corruption. Ayana et al. [3] assessed the progress of decolonization of artificial intelligence governance in sub-Saharan Africa, focusing on indicators such as artificial intelligence governance institutions, national strategies, sovereignty priorities, data protection regulations, and compliance with local data use requirements. Sulkowski and Jebe [4] first applied institutional theory to the ESG reporting governance architecture to better understand this unusual field of rulemaking. The aim of Tallberg et al. [5] is to outline the research agenda for global governance of artificial intelligence. Peng [6] argued that it is important to establish governance models compatible with digital technologies, and therefore governments with digital leadership will become a standard component of digital societies. Stoelhorst and Vishwanathan [7] developed a stakeholder theory of corporate governance based on classical property rights theory, arguing that governance should help individuals achieve freedom and maximize

collective welfare. Connelly et al. [8] studied management research that uses signaling theory to help explain phenomena occurring within and between organizations. Pandey et al. [9] identified prominent themes that form the basis of CG research, the prominent themes in the field and their temporal development, and the latest trends in CG research. Erman and Furendal [10] aimed to develop a theoretical framework for theorizing the political legitimacy of global AI governance and to demonstrate how it can be used as a compass for critically assessing the legitimacy of real-world examples of global AI governance. While the aforementioned literature has accumulated a relatively rich theoretical foundation in areas such as corporate governance, the legitimacy of AI governance, and digital leadership, there are few attempts to systematically integrate Marxist ideas on power supervision with the configuration mechanisms of digital integrity governance. The question of how institutional constraints, technological embedding, and public participation can work together effectively in specific platform practices remains at the empirical descriptive stage, lacking causal identification at the set theory level. This paper addresses this gap by using the fsQCA method to capture the equivalent path of conditional combinations, bridging the gap between normative theory and empirical mechanisms.

### **3. Method**

#### **3.1. Construction of the "institution-technology-subject" three-dimensional analysis model**

Marxist theory of state governance views power supervision as an inherent constraint mechanism for the operation of the state apparatus, while emphasizing the normative requirements of the people as the main body of governance on public power [11, 12]. Based on this, this paper extracts three theoretical propositions and operationalizes them into measurable analytical dimensions. The proposition of power supervision points to the rigid constraint of the system on the exercise of power. Corresponding to the system dimension, two indicators are set: the completeness of regulations and the rigidity of system implementation. The former is calculated by weighting the number of provincial anti-corruption regulations and the coverage of their provisions, while the latter is represented by the product of the annual case filing rate and the rate of disciplinary action implementation by the discipline inspection and supervision organs. The proposition of people's subjectivity points to the public's ability to participate in and supervise the exercise of power. Corresponding to the subject dimension, two indicators are set: the richness of public participation channels and the efficiency of reporting response, measured by the number of types of reporting channels opened on the platform and the average working days from acceptance to feedback for petitions, respectively. The technical dimension is formed by embedding digital technology into the logical chain of power operation trace management, setting three indicators: data sharing degree, algorithmic supervision coverage rate, and blockchain evidence embedding degree. Data sharing degree is calculated by the proportion of cross-departmental data interface connectivity; algorithmic supervision coverage rate is measured by the percentage of power matters covered by automatic early warning rules out of all matters; and blockchain evidence embedding degree is represented by the ratio of the number of on-chain evidence records to the total number of records that should be preserved. These three dimensions, with a total of seven conditional variables, constitute a complete analytical indicator system.

#### **3.2. Sample selection and data acquisition**

Thirty one provincial-level anti-corruption digital platforms across the country are selected as the research samples, and the data collection period is from 2020 to 2024 for five years. The original data sources are divided into three categories: the annual operation report of the platforms published on the official website of the provincial anti-corruption organs, quantitative indicators of the anti-corruption work made public by the

provincial anti-corruption organs in their annual operation reports, and anti-corruption assessment data released by the Rule of Law Index Research Center of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. The values of the 7 conditional variables and one outcome variable are sequentially taken from the above sources to construct a  $31 \times 8$  original data table.

In the data cleaning process, outliers are identified and removed using the three-standard-deviation method. For missing values, Multiple Imputation (MI) is used to generate five imputed datasets, and the mean is taken to fill in the missing values. The variable with the highest missing rate is the degree of blockchain evidence embedding, with a missing rate of 9.7%. Standardization is performed by mapping each variable to the [0, 1] interval using the range method to eliminate the interference of dimensional differences on subsequent calibration. After the above processing, a structured data matrix is output, with rows representing 31 provincial cases and columns representing 7 condition variables and 1 outcome variable. Table 1 shows the descriptive statistical results of each variable.

**Table 1.** Descriptive statistics of variables in provincial-level anti-corruption digital platforms

| Variable                              | Description                                                        | Mean  | SD    | Min   | Max   |
|---------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Data Sharing Degree                   | Cross-departmental data interface connectivity ratio               | 0.573 | 0.142 | 0.218 | 0.861 |
| Algorithm Supervision Coverage        | Proportion of power items covered by automatic early-warning rules | 0.486 | 0.167 | 0.153 | 0.824 |
| Blockchain Evidence Embedding         | Ratio of on-chain records to total required records                | 0.392 | 0.183 | 0.074 | 0.793 |
| Regulatory Completeness               | Weighted coverage index of provincial integrity regulations        | 0.641 | 0.119 | 0.367 | 0.902 |
| Institutional Enforcement Rigidity    | Product of case-filing rate and disciplinary execution rate        | 0.558 | 0.131 | 0.281 | 0.847 |
| Public Participation Richness         | Normalized count of reporting channel types                        | 0.507 | 0.158 | 0.192 | 0.836 |
| Reporting Response Efficiency         | Inverse of average working days from acceptance to feedback        | 0.463 | 0.174 | 0.126 | 0.781 |
| Integrity Governance Efficiency Index | Weighted composite of three sub-indicators                         | 0.542 | 0.149 | 0.197 | 0.873 |

Table 1 shows that the mean score for the completeness of regulations is 0.641, the highest among all variables, indicating that the overall construction of provincial-level anti-corruption regulations is relatively mature. The mean score for blockchain evidence embedding is only 0.392 with a standard deviation of 0.183, reflecting significant differences in the promotion efforts of various provinces in the application of this technology. The minimum score for the whistleblower response efficiency is 0.126, indicating that the processing cycle for petitions in some provinces is still relatively long, and the immediate feedback mechanism for public supervision needs to be strengthened. The range of the outcome variable, the anti-corruption governance effectiveness index, is 0.676, showing significant inter-provincial differentiation and providing ample room for variation for subsequent configuration comparisons.

### 3.3. Variable calibration and assignment

The variables in the output structured data matrix have been standardized by range, but fsQCA requires that continuous variables be converted into fuzzy membership scores. Therefore, direct calibration needs to be performed on each of the eight variables. The direct calibration method relies on the setting of three qualitative anchor points: the complete membership anchor point corresponds to the threshold of "completely belonging to the set", the cross point corresponds to the threshold of "maximum fuzziness", and the complete non-membership anchor point corresponds to the threshold of "completely not belonging to the set". This paper adopts a dual-reference strategy for anchor point determination, that is, it simultaneously refers to the quartile distribution of the sample data and the empirical thresholds reported in existing anti-corruption research literature. Taking data sharing as an example, the complete membership anchor point is taken as the 95th percentile value of the variable, 0.831; the cross point is taken as the 50th percentile value, 0.573; and the complete non-membership anchor point is taken as the 5th percentile value, 0.237. The anchor points for the remaining six conditional variables and outcome variables are set separately according to the same logic, and the specific values are adjusted according to the distribution characteristics of each variable.

The raw scores of the 31 cases are then mapped to a standardized value for each case on each variable and the built-in "calibrate" function in the fsQCA 3.0 software is applied to obtain a fuzzy membership degree ranging from 0 to 1. If the cases have the same value as the 0.5 value, the transformation will create an uncertain situation when calculating boolean operations. This paper will not add or subtract a small constant, such as 0.001. The fuzzy membership degree assignment matrix is obtained after calibration, which is a 31 row  $\times$  8 column matrix, whose element represents the degree of belonging of the corresponding provincial platform to a given set of variables. This matrix will be used as the input data for the construction of truth table.

### 3.4. Truth table construction and configuration path identification

The output fuzzy membership assignment matrix has 31 cases and 8 variables. The truth table algorithm is then performed after inputting it into the fsQCA 3.0 software. Theoretically 7 condition variables will produce 128 rows of truth tables, and 24 will be cases. The case frequency threshold is set to 1, so that every row contains at least a case and the consistency threshold is set at 0.80, which means that if the case frequency is less than 0.80, the result variables for the row below this threshold are set to 0, meaning that the condition combination is insufficient for the condition to be a high-efficiency governance. To keep contradictory configuration rows out of the result set which interpret both positive and negative results, the PRI consistency threshold is also set to 0.70. Following screening, 14 valid configurations are left for Boolean minimization.

There are three types of solutions to Boolean minimization, namely complex, simplified and intermediate solutions; the latter involves only logical remainders that agree with the direction anticipated by theory. This paper takes the intermediate solution as the main reporting basis and also takes the intersection of the simplified solution and the intermediate solution. Conditions that occur in the intersection are indicated as core conditions of the path, and conditions that occur only in a simplified solution, but not in an intermediate solution, are indicated as auxiliary conditions. The calculation provides three equivalent configuration paths, each with three parameters: original coverage, unique coverage, consistency. The 7 condition variables are shown in Figure 1 and their necessity and consistency scores are shown.




**Figure 1.** Ranking of the importance of condition variables

As shown in Figure 1, the necessity consistency score for algorithmic supervision coverage is 0.87, ranking highest among the seven conditional variables and appearing in all three configuration paths. Data sharing has a necessity consistency score of 0.82, which is also a tie for three most frequent. These two factors together create the key technical conditions of high efficiency clean governance. The frequency of the efficiency of the whistleblower response is only once, with the necessity consistency score less than 0.70, and the richness of public participation channels is also only once and less than 0.70; both of the above indicate that the subject dimensional variables are not decisive enough, exist as auxiliary conditions, and participate in the configuration.

### 3.5. In-depth interviews and explanation of the path mechanism

Three equivalent configuration paths (paths 1, 2 and 3) are output, and the top two provincial platforms with regard to unique coverage ranking are chosen as typical cases, which leads to a total of six typical cases. A total of 12 interviewees (1 platform manager and 1 technical operations engineer per case). They run on the web through video and each interview is 45 to 60 minutes long. The interview outline is designed to include differentiated questions for the core conditions (variables) that are set in the configuration path. As an example, when both algorithm supervision coverage and data sharing are essential conditions, the emphasis is on asking about the approval process for the algorithm from the design phase through deployment, as well as on the permissions barriers faced during the cross-departmental integration of data interfaces and the resolution methods.

The recordings of the interviews are transcribed by hand and then analyzed with a 3-level coding system: open coding identifies 156 initial concepts, axial coding classifies the concepts into 23 categories, and selective coding finally narrows down the causal mechanism chains to the three configuration paths, one-to-one. The coding process is carried out independently by two researchers who get a Kappa coefficient of 0.83, which means there is a high level of consistency. The coding outcomes resulted in an operational narrative with temporal logic with the conditional combinations provided by the fsQCA, which illustrates the triggering order and synergistic processes between the conditional variables.

## 4. Results and discussion

### 4.1. Experimental arrangement

Using the software environment fsQCA 3.0, the experiment is conducted, while the interview text encoding is carried out in NVivo 12. The experimental data included operational records of 31 anti-corruption digital platforms, which are available at the provincial level, from 2020 to 2024. The outcome variable is the "Integrity Governance Effectiveness Index", which is a weighted composite of three secondary indicators: the handling rate of complaints and reports (0.4); completeness rate of power operation record keeping (0.35); average case completion cycle (0.25). The weights are calculated from the two Delphi expert consultation rounds, involving 15 experts from discipline inspection and supervision practice departments and public administration disciplines. The consistency threshold is 0.80, the PRI consistency threshold is 0.70, and case frequency threshold is 1 for the Boolean operation of minimization. All three parameter settings are based on the operating specifications recommended by Ragin for the fsQCA so that the processing of the logical remainder and the contradictory rows are adhered to in order to keep the process rigorous. Operation logs are recorded throughout the experiment to support result reproducibility.

### 4.2. Configuration coverage analysis

After the coverage and consistency parameters of the three equivalent configuration paths are output by fsQCA 3.0 software, they are arranged in descending order of the original coverage. At the same time, the role labels (core conditions or auxiliary conditions) and absence status of the condition variables involved in each path are extracted, and the condition configuration information and coverage indicators are integrated into a unified matrix. The result is shown in Figure 2.




**Figure 2.** Configuration path conditions and coverage

Path 1 achieved the highest initial coverage (0.523) and uniqueness (0.187) among the three paths. This path is driven by three core conditions: data sharing, algorithmic oversight coverage, and the rigidity of institutional enforcement. This reflects the strongest explanatory power of the synergistic effect of technological penetration and institutional constraints on the effectiveness of clean governance. Path 2 and Path 3 had initial coverage of 0.416 and 0.378 respectively, with uniqueness coverage of 0.093 and 0.071, indicating significant overlap between the cases explained by Path 2 and Path 3 and Path 1, with relatively limited independent contributions. Data sharing and algorithmic oversight coverage appeared at the core

condition positions of the two paths. The overall solution coverage of 0.786 and consistency of 0.867 indicate that the three paths jointly explained the vast majority of high-efficiency cases and maintained high logical consistency. The repeated appearance of technological variables confirms the structural support role of digital oversight tools in constraining the exercise of power.

#### 4.3. Configuration consistency

The consistency test is designed to assess the amount of set-theoretic membership in terms of outcome variables of the cases covered by each set of conditions. It also calls for an independent evaluation of conditions' necessary to determine common antecedents across paths. The consistency of the three equivalent configuration paths, the PRI consistency and the necessity consistency of the seven condition variables are summarized in this section and illustrated in Table 2.

**Table 2.** Configuration path consistency and necessity test of condition variables

| Test Object                                                                                                     | Consistency | PRI Consistency |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|-----------------|
| Path 1 (Data Sharing × Algorithm Supervision Coverage × Institutional Enforcement Rigidity)                     | 0.94        | 0.88            |
| Path 2 (Algorithm Supervision Coverage × Blockchain Evidence Embedding × Public Participation Channel Richness) | 0.92        | 0.85            |
| Path 3 (Data Sharing × Blockchain Evidence Embedding × Regulatory Completeness × Reporting Response Efficiency) | 0.91        | 0.83            |
| Overall Solution                                                                                                | 0.92        | 0.86            |
| Algorithm Supervision Coverage (Necessity)                                                                      | 0.87        | 0.81            |
| Data Sharing (Necessity)                                                                                        | 0.76        | 0.69            |
| Blockchain Evidence Embedding (Necessity)                                                                       | 0.72        | 0.65            |
| Institutional Enforcement Rigidity (Necessity)                                                                  | 0.68        | 0.61            |
| Regulatory Completeness (Necessity)                                                                             | 0.63        | 0.57            |
| Public Participation Channel Richness (Necessity)                                                               | 0.59        | 0.52            |
| Reporting Response Efficiency (Necessity)                                                                       | 0.55        | 0.48            |

Path 1's consistency score is 0.94 while Path 2's consistency score is 0.92 and Path 3's consistency score is 0.91. The three-condition combination represents a hard constraint on the output of the algorithm due to the rigidity of the institutional implementation, giving rise to a reduced execution deviation space, which constrains the fluctuations of the path membership degree of cases and leads to a consistency score of 0.92. For the necessity test, the consistency score for algorithm supervision coverage is 0.87, which is still lower than the 0.90 score. The failure to meet the standard is because the algorithm models are deployed on a limited basis in some central and western provinces due to the lack of grassroots data collection ability, and in high efficiency cases, there are individual cases with low membership degree for this condition. This finding suggests that one technical factor cannot be considered a prerequisite for high effectiveness in clean governance and that the linkage between these factors is a core mechanism of efficiency.

#### 4.4. Performance of blockchain evidence storage mechanism

The fuzzy membership degree value of 0.5 is used to split 31 provincial platforms into two sets: High-Embedded (HE) and Low-Embedded (LE) sets. The handling cycle of petitions/complaints and completeness

rate of power operation record keeping are respectively extracted as two indicators. The statistical significance of the differences between the groups is evaluated by independent samples t test. The distribution of indicators and test statistics of each sample is summarized and displayed. The results are shown in Figure 3.




**Figure 3.** Distribution and differences of secondary indicators between high and low embedding groups of blockchain evidence storage

The average processing time for complaints and reports in the high-embedded group is 5.8 days, a reduction of approximately 37% from the 9.2 days in the low-embedded group ( $t$ -value: -3.67,  $p$ -value: less than 0.01). This difference stems from the fact that blockchain-based evidence storage records the flow, receipt, and feedback of complaint materials on an immutable on-chain record, reducing the delays and backtracking times inherent in traditional paper-based approval processes. Regarding the completeness of the record-keeping, the high-embedded group averaged 96.7%, while the low-embedded group achieved 81.2% ( $t$ -value: 4.21,  $p$ -value: less than 0.001). This gap is closely related to the on-chain automatic evidence storage mechanism—each step of power operation triggers a smart contract that is instantly recorded on the blockchain, eliminating the need for manual supplementation and selective record-keeping. The significant inter-group differentiation in both indicators demonstrates that the degree of blockchain-based evidence storage has a stable and quantifiable positive contribution to improving the effectiveness of clean governance.

## 5. Conclusion

The success of digitally-enabled anti-corruption governance does not rely on the adoption of a single technology, but on the interplay between the "hard-to-change" constraints of the system, the extent to which the technology is embedded, and the dynamism of public involvement. In Marxism's theory of power supervision the people's primary function is re-activated in the digital sphere, where algorithmic supervision and data sharing are not a substitute for human judgement, but rather a process where they create a traceable, verifiable and visible process of governance that performs the function of the people. Blockchains, however, take the power to selectively store evidence and tinker with it after the fact out of the picture entirely. Multiple equivalent paths emerged in the process of configuration analysis, with the fact that the eastern and the central-western regions can converge in terms of governance effectiveness with different combinations, reflecting

differences in resource endowments. This provides a basis for differentiated policy design. But the sample is only at the provincial level and the city/County level variation is not fully represented. Moreover, cross-sectional data is not sufficient to describe the dynamic effects in the long term of technology embedding. Longitudinal tracking designs should be further used and more in-depth analysis hierarchy should be discussed in future research.

## References

- [1] Perlman, B. J., Reddick, C., & Demir, T. (2023). A compliance—integrity framework for ethics management: An empirical analysis of local government practice. *Public Administration Review*, 83(4), 823–837. <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/puar.13610>
- [2] Al-Faryan, M. A. S. (2024). Agency theory, corporate governance and corruption: An integrative literature review approach. *Cogent Social Sciences*, 10(1), 2337893. <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23311886.2024.2337893>
- [3] Ayana, G., Dese, K., Nemomssa, H. D., & Taye, M. (2024). Decolonizing global AI governance: Assessment of the state of decolonized AI governance in Sub-Saharan Africa. *Royal Society Open Science*, 11(8), 231994. <https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC11303018/>
- [4] Sulkowski, A., & Jebe, R. (2022). Evolving ESG reporting governance, regime theory, and proactive law: Predictions and strategies. *American Business Law Journal*, 59(3), 449–503. <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ablj.12210>
- [5] Tallberg, J., Erman, E., Furendal, M., & Lundgren, M. (2023). The global governance of artificial intelligence: Next steps for empirical and normative research. *International Studies Review*, 25(3), viad040. <https://academic.oup.com/isr/article/25/3/viad040/7259354>
- [6] Peng, B. (2022). Digital leadership: State governance in the era of digital technology. *Cultures of Science*, 5(4), 210–225. <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/2096608321989835>
- [7] Stoelhorst, J. W., & Vishwanathan, P. (2024). Beyond primacy: A stakeholder theory of corporate governance. *Academy of Management Review*, 49(1), 107–134. <https://journals.aom.org/doi/abs/10.5465/amr.2020.0268>
- [8] Connelly, B. L., Certo, S. T., Reutzel, C. R., & Busenbark, J. R. (2025). Signaling theory: State of the theory and its future. *Journal of Management*, 51(1), 24–61. <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/01492063241268459>
- [9] Pandey, N., Andres, C., & Kumar, S. (2023). Mapping the corporate governance scholarship: Current state and future directions. *Corporate Governance: An International Review*, 31(1), 127–160. <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/corg.12444>
- [10] Erman, E., & Furendal, M. (2024). Artificial intelligence and the political legitimacy of global governance. *Political Studies*, 72(2), 421–441. <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/00323217221126665>
- [11] Das, R. J. (2023). Marxism and revisionism in the world today. *Capital & Class*, 47(3), 383–406. <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/03098168221139287>
- [12] Dinerstein, A. C. (2024). On motley feminism: A decolonising Marxism for a thesis 14 of Marxism-feminism. *Capital & Class*, 48(2), 253–271. <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/03098168241234112>